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Just south of Tanzania’s border with Kenya, the teeming
Serengeti Plains are sundered by a 30-mile long and 300-feet
deep gash. This dramatic erosional feature is Olduvai Gorge,
an iconic name in human prehistory. Seen from the air in the
clear evening light, and especially on those occasions—not
rare—when its rim is touched with gold, the Gorge exudes a
soft, magical aura that approaches the mystical. During the
height of the day, in contrast, this rugged ravine is a hell-hole
of hot, rough rock, whose variegated colors are almost
bleached out by the scorching intensity of the sun. This is
not a place where most rational people would choose to tarry
any longer than absolutely necessary. Yet, if you carefully
approach the Gorge’s dizzying edge at certain times of year,
you will sometimes see, far below, some tiny figures delving
into the hot earth at the Gorge’s bottom. These are paleoan-
thropologists, scientists involved in uncovering evidence of
the human past. For the rocks exposed in the walls of the
Gorge are witnesses to almost 2 my of geological and human
history, and have attracted paleontologists, archeologists, and
others ever since the Gorge’s discovery in the early years of
the last century. Most famously, this is the place where Mary
and Louis Leakey discovered the remarkable “Zinjanthropus”
skull in 1959, and from which Homo habilis—“handy
man”—was reported a few years later.
Looking at those half-naked, sunburned figures sweating
away far below, you cannot help but reflect that they hardly
conform to the popular stereotype of the scientist. Ask most
people for their image of a typical scientist and chances are
that they will conjure up visions of a white-coated figure
tending high-tech instruments in a spotless air-conditioned
laboratory or covering a well-worn blackboard with
elaborate mathematical formulae in an ivy-covered building
on some ancient campus. And, at least to a certain extent,
this is not inaccurate. Some scientists, possibly even a
majority, do look and behave this way at least some of the
time. But scientists are people, and they are quite as diverse
as any other category of human being. Some labor in the
field like those at Olduvai; others rarely leave the comfort
and safety of the laboratory. What do these disparate
individuals have in common? What is it that gives science
its unity and sets it apart from all other forms of human
endeavor?
Let us put one common misapprehension to rest right
away. It is not that they are all diligently applying “the
scientific method”. Indeed, there is no single “scientific
method”. Scientific methods of course there are, in
abundance; and methodologies lie at the heart of the
immense variety of different things that scientists do. But
different techniques are used for tackling different prob-
lems, and there is no particular “method” that will give you
the key to all types of scientific inquiry.
The Nature of Science
Perhaps, then, if it is not a method of investigation that
gives science its unity, it might be better to start with what
science is not. And this is important, because in America
today, more perhaps than in any other advanced nation,
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there is a widespread mistrust of science that is largely born
of a lack of understanding of what science is and is not. On
the one hand, we are happy to enjoy the many benefits of
science; on the other, we tend to fear scientific advance or
at least to look upon it askance. At one end of the negative
spectrum we imagine practical disaster, as technology runs
amok. At the other, we find the political imposition in
schools of the tenets of creationism taught as science, as if
mainstream scientific beliefs were somehow intrinsically
opposed to those of religion—which they are most
emphatically not. Religion is based on faith, whereas
science is grounded in doubt; and although both religion
and science do deal with questions of origin, the province
of religion is ultimate cause, whereas the causes investigat-
ed by science are proximate ones. It seems highly unlikely
that science will ever penetrate the ultimate mysteries that
religion deals in—and it probably will not even seriously
try, although of course it is not hard to find a scientist
willing to pontificate about virtually any subject you want.
The creationist misunderstanding, in particular, stems
from the notion that science is an authoritarian system of
belief that tells us in absolutist terms how and what the
universe is. Here the rather alienating image of the white-
coated scientist, rigorously quantifying the world in the
remoteness of his laboratory, does not help at all. It is,
indeed, hard to imagine a more intimidating authority figure
than white-coat, his clipboard covered with incomprehen-
sible hieroglyphics that the uninitiated—you and I—will
never understand. It would certainly be better if the more
user-friendly image of the overheated and disheveled field
worker had wider currency.
Still, either way, the pursuit is essentially the same. For
all scientific knowledge, however acquired, is inherently
provisional. Most scientists will readily acknowledge this
reality. No scientist who thinks twice about the matter is
going to claim that he or she is really in pursuit of “the
truth” or has any hope of demonstrating it definitively,
although this is admittedly a mindset that it is all too easy to
slip into. All any honest scientist is really trying to do is to
approximate the truth, in the realization that ultimate truth
is unknowable through scientific means and that the
knowledge he or she generates is invariably susceptible to
modification.
This is why the familiar mantra of creationists, that
“Darwinism is only a theory”, (see the article in this issue
by T. Ryan Gregory) merely shows how deeply these well-
meaning people misunderstand what science is all about.
For in the most profound of senses, all scientific knowledge
is “only a theory”. Religious belief is a matter of revealed
truth and is thus (within interpretive limits) unchanging.
Scientific belief, on the other hand, is even in principle only
valid as long as it can resist attempts to show that it is
wrong. Indeed, whereas science as a whole embodies a
profound feeling that progress can be made—for otherwise,
what is the point of the whole enterprise?—there is no way
in which we can make scientific progress unless we can
demonstrate that what we now believe is wrong or at least
incomplete.
The way I like to look at it is that the core of the
scientific endeavor amounts simply to the corporate effort
to describe nature and its workings as accurately as
possible. Some of these descriptions are very strongly
supported and are unlikely to change dramatically with
time. Others are shakier, and it is also an unavoidable fact
that the solution of one scientific problem regularly leads to
the identification of others that are at least as tricky.
Throughout the history of science, the successful climbing
of an intellectual summit has always revealed new peaks
beckoning beyond. The upshot is that what scientists are
emphatically not doing is steadily building up a picture of
“the truth”.
If this were the case, the practice of science would be
rather like doing a giant jigsaw puzzle in which each
correctly placed piece becomes a permanent part of a
gradually emerging but still essentially static picture. By
implication, the picture will at some stage be complete and
from day to day what is already established will not change.
However, even if there must in principle be a dead-accurate
description of the world out there somewhere, like the
picture on the puzzle box, science is not equipped to
identify it as such. Instead, the process of science is much
more like negotiating a hugely complex maze, and the
history of science is littered with false starts and back-
trackings. New ideas—new descriptions of nature, mostly
tiny corners of it—are proposed, and once those ideas and
observations are out there in the public arena, they can be
tested. Very often these new notions, usually proposed to
correct deficiencies identified in earlier ideas or to accom-
modate new data that do not fit with whatever was previously
believed, will turn out to be wrong either in detail or in their
entirety. The neat part, though, is that this does not matter at
all. In science it is no crime to be wrong, unless you are
(inappropriately) laying claim to the truth. What matters is
that science as a whole is a self-correcting mechanism in
which both new and old notions are constantly under
scrutiny. In other words, the edifice of scientific knowledge
consists simply of a body of observations and ideas that
have (so far) proven resistant to attack and that are thus
accepted as working hypotheses about nature. This may
sound like a rather rough-and-ready way of proceeding; but
clearly, in the mere two or three centuries that have elapsed
since recognizable science began to come into existence, it
has brought us a remarkably long way. Few would dispute
that in this time science truly has revolutionized all of our
lives in a way in which no other approach to knowledge has
ever managed to do.
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Falsifiability
For this system of provisional knowledge to work, it is
necessary that, to the extent possible, scientific hypotheses
be proposed in such a way that they are at least potentially
falsifiable—provable to be wrong. Nonscientific statements
about the world can simply be judged by the criterion of
plausibility, which is fine in its place; but a scientific
statement has to be subject to disproof if it is wrong or
lacking something. It has to be one that, if wrong, can be
shown to be so by more than simply assertion. Scientists
should not be out to prove anything. Of course, many areas
of science depend heavily on techniques of mathematical
description, and mathematicians are frequently in search of
“proofs” of one conjecture or another. But it is a mistake to
confuse quantifiability with objectivity. The various
branches of mathematics are essentially systems of logic
that are based on axiomatic starting assumptions. And
whereas scientists find the techniques of mathematical
description very helpful in characterizing the world, they
themselves cannot start from assumptions. They have to
start from what they know about the world, in the
knowledge that what they think they know is always
subject to change.
That is the theory, anyway, and it applies pretty well in
the experimental sciences such as physics. There, scientists
generally start either from new hypotheses that they hope
describe the world accurately or from established notions
that seem to be becoming a little wobbly. These they test
against new data garnered by experiment and observation,
often expressly for the purpose. There is, however, another
category of sciences, which few reasonable observers will
deny are “scientific”, but in which the nature of the
phenomena being studied precludes those involved from
taking the experimental route. These are the “historical
sciences”, most notably evolutionary biology. We can study
the functioning of the hereditary molecules within each cell
by conventional scientific methods of experimentation, but
what we cannot test directly by setting up experiments is
the history of those molecules: exactly how they came to be
as they are, and how their properties came to be distributed
in nature in the way that we observe. These are matters of
history on an immensely long timescale, and those histories
can never be replicated in the laboratory. Fortunately,
though, there is a way around this. Experimental scientists
make predictions about the outcomes of their experiments,
and then compare the data gathered against those predic-
tions. And so do evolutionary biologists. The difference is
merely that, in their case, the experiments have already
been made long ago.
The central prediction that emerges from evolutionary
theory is based on the common descent of all life forms.
For if all life is descended from a single common ancestor,
then we should expect to see a “nested” pattern of
resemblance among the varied descendants of that ancestor.
It should be possible to represent all of life in a single
branching diagram that ramifies upwards from a single
ancestor at the bottom. Actually, things seem to have been a
bit more complicated than this, at least at the beginning of
the history of life. All life may not, in fact, have had a
singular origin (and why should it; if simple self-replicating
molecules could emerge once, then why not multiple times
in a largely competition-free age?), and, early on, at least
one significant new form of life may have risen from a
combination of old ones. The important thing, though, is
that we would never have realized or have begun to
understand this if we had not started from a hypothesis—
that all life did have a common origin—which we could test
and refine by reference to the structure of the living world
around us.
In any event, subsequent to the establishment of the
major groups of living organisms, we do find a very strong
overall signal when we compare the distribution of
characteristics among the presumed descendant forms.
People have realized this since time immemorial, of course.
“Folk taxonomies” have long reflected the realization that
the living world is organized into groups-within-groups that
can be defined on the basis of characteristics that their
members share; and nobody who has any familiarity with
the living world has any problem distinguishing a bird from
a bat or a flying fish. What science allows us to do is to
move beyond such levels of generality and more precisely
to specify the relationships among organisms. Under
scientific scrutiny, these sometimes turn out unexpectedly;
who would have thought that lungfish are more closely
related to cows than they are to salmon?
Among the very few philosophers of science who have
been taken at all seriously by scientists themselves was the
late Sir Karl Popper, the leading proponent of the notion of
falsifiability as the crux of scientific ideas. Especially in his
early days, Popper took a rather dim view of evolutionary
biology as science, claiming quite fairly that there are “no
evolutionary laws”. But here Popper was missing his own
point. If scientific knowledge is provisional, as the
falsifiability criterion implies, then we probably should
not be looking for unvarying “laws” at all, however
tempting such a pursuit might be. “Rules of thumb” might
be a better term for most scientific generalizations.
Later in his career, Popper softened his stance somewhat,
describing evolutionary biology as a “metaphysical re-
search program”. Whatever this actually means, it falls
upon the ear as vaguely derogatory, and Popper’s descrip-
tion was seized upon eagerly by the foes of evolution. For
whatever it may actually be, metaphysics sounds like the
antithesis of science. But in Popper’s universe, this change
of terminology actually amounted to something of a
38 Evo Edu Outreach (2008) 1:36–41
compliment, as for him it carried the implication that
Darwinism provided “a possible framework for testable
scientific hypotheses”. And it turns out that the unfolding of
an evolutionary history is the best explanation we have—
and the only predictive one—for the pattern of life we see
around us. If the living world was created by a supernatural
being, then the world is the way it is simply because that
being wanted it this way. Fine, if this is what you happen to
believe; just do not dress it up as science. The notion of
evolution predicts the nested pattern of relationships we
find in the living world; supernatural creation, on the other
hand, predicts nothing. It is concepts of this latter kind that
are truly untestable: and what else is faith about, after all?
Of course, this notion of falsifiability is inherently
incomplete. It deals with how ideas should be posed so
that they can be evaluated. But it begs an obvious question:
where do the ideas, good or bad, come from in the first
place? Well, there are no rules for human creativity—how
could there be?—and science depends on creative thought
and intuition quite as much as any other branch of human
endeavor. When we consider the origin of truly new ideas
in science, we are, essentially, dealing with the mysteries of
human cognition. “Eureka!” is a reaction that is familiar in
science (though maybe not as familiar as many of us would
like!); but it is, alas, not something that can be consciously
conjured up.
Science as a Collective Enterprise
So far, I have been speaking mostly of the kind of science
practiced by individual scientists or by teams of them. But
we should never forget that science is above all a huge
worldwide collective enterprise. For whereas it is possible
to imagine a world without scientists, or with many
millions of them, short of a post disaster scenario it is
literally impossible to imagine a world with just one. From
well before the early days when the savants who founded
London’s Royal Society gathered regularly to compare their
observations of nature, science has been recognized as a
corporate enterprise. Isaac Newton was not the first to have
said, two and a half centuries ago, that if he had seen farther
it was because he had stood on the shoulders of giants. But
this classic remark encapsulates a basic verity of the
scientific process. This is, that all science has to start from
what is currently known about the world or from what is
believed about it. And this in turn helps to explain why it is
so difficult to put one’s finger on the origins of science
itself. Science depends on an enormous body of knowledge
that has been accumulated over the centuries, thanks to the
efforts of countless investigators. So, given the great inertia
of large bodies of anything, how does scientific change
occur at all?
The most persuasive and comprehensive account of this
process was published some 40 years ago by Thomas
Kuhn, the only philosopher of science whose fame rivals
Popper’s. Kuhn, who started life as a physicist, was acutely
aware of the role of the scientific community as a whole in
spurring scientific advance. In his book The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn pointed out that at any one
time belief in any particular area of science tends to be
dominated by what he called a “paradigm”, a generally
accepted explanatory framework into which new observa-
tions are incorporated as a matter of course. Such paradigms
initially become dominant as large numbers of scientists are
attracted away from competing forms of explanation. And
they stand at the origin of new traditions of scientific
research, as the new paradigm reveals new questions to be
explored. As time passes, however, paradigms tend to ossify
into forms of received wisdom, even as new observations
about the world accumulate. The tendency among scientists
will be to try to understand these within the context of the
accepted paradigm; but at some point, so many anomalies
will have been identified that a new explanatory framework
becomes necessary. At such moments, science is ready to
witness a “paradigm shift” in which the old framework is
rejected in favor of a new one that can more convincingly
accommodate new observations.
This is rarely an overnight process. I was fortunate
enough to be studying geology in graduate school just at
the moment when the new notion of “plate tectonics” was
being born. At the beginning of the 1960s, it was generally
believed that the basic form of the Earth’s surface was
static. Of course, evidence of earth movements was
abundant in the geological record, and phenomena such
as the gigantic Krakatoa explosion of 1883 or the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake, were only too fresh in memory. But
even the largest such events were viewed as essentially
local; and geologists sought local causes for them, often
with enormous sophistication and ingenuity. Around the
turn of the 1960s, however, a new generation of geologists
began to make observations that tied earthquake zones,
volcanism, rifting of continents and seafloors, mountain
building, and a host of other geological phenomena to a
picture of the Earth’s surface that was constantly undergo-
ing change. It turned out that, as some mavericks had
already theorized, geography is unstable after all. Instead,
the continents are mobile blocks of relatively light rock
floating on the heavier molten rocks below them. Oceans
are formed by the rifting-apart of continental blocks,
whereas the huge forces unleashed by collisions between
the drifting fragments are responsible for earthquakes and
mountain building, and volcanoes reflect the escape of
molten material from below. If it were not for this constant
and often violent process of renewal, the continental
surfaces would long ago have eroded and subsided below
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the surface of the oceans, and there would be nowhere for
terrestrial life. Thus, in a remarkably short time, a new
explanatory framework was developed that provided, for
the first time, a comprehensive mechanism knitting together
a world of apparently diverse geological phenomena.
You might have thought that geologists would have been
delighted by this intellectual unification. Not necessarily so.
There was tremendous resistance to the new ideas, not just
among the old guard but also among younger colleagues
who remained under their influence. This is hardly surprising
or even reprehensible: it takes a while to detect which way
the wind is blowing, and it is tough to reject principles to
which one has devoted one’s career. And of course, the new
field of plate tectonics certainly did not summarily invalidate
the vast bulk of the detailed local observations on which
other geological explanations had been founded. What is
more, there is considerable inertia built into the process of
scientific education. Textbooks take years to change with
new knowledge, and it is remarkable how early it is in the
educational process that the mindsets of young scientists
become established. It is a huge responsibility for any
teacher to present a view of a scientific field to students who
are hearing it for the first time; for an effective teacher will
almost certainly inculcate a view of the world which down
the line will prove very difficult to modify in their students’
minds—however much the evidence changes. Add to this
that the role of doubt in the scientific process is far too rarely
taught to aspiring scientists, and the potentially oppressive
power of received wisdom is painfully apparent.
Still, Kuhn was undoubtedly right: paradigms must
change sooner or later, as knowledge accumulates. For the
piling-up of anomalous observations cannot forever be
ignored and must eventually lead to the demise of
inadequate explanatory frameworks, however tenaciously
they linger. The history of science has borne this pattern out
over and over again, and in fact, it is not necessarily only
new observations that lead to paradigm shifts. For some
paradigms are essentially intellectual: they are views of
how science should be done and are not dependent on any
specific set of observations. Indeed, in my own science of
paleoanthropology, we are at this very moment in the
middle of a paradigm shift of this kind.
Let me explain. When I was in graduate school, my
office was a desk in a basement storeroom of a natural
history museum. I would watch enviously as visiting
scientists pored for hours over fossils that they pulled from
the cabinets that lined the room, making reams of notes and
measurements. For it seemed that these people—these
initiates—knew exactly what they were doing, whereas
nobody had yet taken the trouble to explain to me how to
go about studying fossils. I had attended innumerable
courses in vertebrate paleontology, of course, but the
emphasis was usually on the instructor’s interpretations of
particular fossils, rather than on how they were arrived at.
Eventually, I found the courage to ask a distinguished
paleoanthropologist what the secret of studying fossils was.
The answer? “You look at them long enough, and they speak
to you.”Well, yes, okay. It is true that sheer familiarity with
fossils will reveal things about them that nothing else can.
But as my colleagueMilfordWolpoff once said, “I’ve spent a
lot of time alone with fossils, and none of them ever said a
word.” It is useless, of course, to deny that a largely seat-of-
the-pants approach to studying fossils had served paleontol-
ogists well since the early nineteenth century. An intuitive
appreciation of anatomical similarities and how they are
distributed among living organisms had permitted some very
smart people to arrive at a remarkably detailed and accurate
description of the diversity of life. But even as I was
receiving my rather dusty answer to my innocent question, I
felt that surely there must be something more than this in the
study of mute fossils.
And, of course, there is. Good fortune took me at the
beginning of the 1970s to the American Museum of Natural
History where a revolution in systematics (the science of
analyzing relationships among organisms) was getting
underway. This was the introduction into American
systematics of “cladistic” methods (from the Greek word,
clados, for “branch”). Traditionally, the paleoanthropolog-
ical notion of theoretical rigor was to look at the “total
morphological pattern” rather than at single characters in
deciphering evolutionary relationships. The problem was,
of course, that nobody could agree on what total morpho-
logical patterns actually were, so competing notions of
relationship were impossible to test. Cladistics, in contrast,
focuses on individual characters and recognizes the signif-
icance of the distinction between “primitive” and “derived”
character states. For whereas common possession of
primitive character states (those present in the ancestor of
the group) indicates overall group membership, relation-
ships within the group are only specified by the common
possession of derived character states. These relationships
are represented in branching diagrams called “cladograms”.
I will spare you the details of how primitive vs derived
characters are recognized and how cladograms are con-
structed; suffice it to say that, with the advent of cladistics,
systematics had finally acquired a truly scientific basis. For
the statement “A and B possess derived characters not
shared with C”, which is what your simplest cladogram
says, is truly testable, as is the inference that A and B are
most closely related by common ancestry. With this
approach in our toolkit, we can proceed to construct a
firmly testable framework on which to hang our other
hypotheses about the evolutionary histories of the groups
we are interested in.
Of course, if we go beyond this to more complex (and
admittedly more interesting) statements, for example, to
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hypotheses of ancestry and descent, the picture becomes
murkier because such notions cannot be tested; we are
back to probability judgements, and unquantifiable ones
at that, although now we can see where they are coming
from. The narrow-minded might conclude from this that
science should stop right there; that when we move away
from the strictly testable, we are moving beyond the
boundaries of science. But of course, there is no reason
whatever why scientists should not investigate the murkier
and more intractable (not to mention more interesting)
areas of human experience—and every reason why they
should!
Science and Paleoanthropology
The science of paleoanthropology is a case in point. A full
understanding of the lives of our early precursors goes
well beyond knowing to whom they were most closely
related. And filling in this story is precisely what was
going on at Olduvai where we began this discussion.
Some of those tiny figures down there on the Gorge’s hot
floor might have been paleontologists, looking for direct
bony evidence of early humans and the animals they lived
among. Others were probably archaeologists, looking for
traces of early human activities (and indeed, it was at
Olduvai that truly ancient stone tools were identified for
the first time). Some may have been geologists, refining
their ideas about what the rocks exposed in the Gorge’s
walls are telling us about past conditions. And yet others
might have been taphonomists, scientists who try to elu-
cidate what happens to animals after they die, and thus to
understand exactly how the fragmentary evidence of the
past has come down to us today. It is very important to
know this, for not everything we observe can be taken at
face value.
At one time, for example, it was believed that a 1.8-
million-year-old circle of stones that had been noticed at a
site on the Gorge’s floor represented the remains of a
deliberately constructed windbreak. If so, this was the
earliest structure known, antedating anything comparable
by well over a million years. Closer examination—testing
of this hypothesis—showed, however, that the “stone
circle” was almost certainly the result of shattering and
scattering of stones by the roots of a growing tree. In ret-
rospect, this was an early shot in a battle to revise, radically,
our perspective on the nature of early hominids. At one
time, these were widely viewed as little more than
primitive, unsophisticated versions of Homo sapiens.
Today, however, it is widely recognized that looking at
our predecessors as junior league versions of ourselves may
be profoundly misleading as a guide to understanding the
kinds of creatures they were: another example, if on a very
small scale, of paradigm change.
And hence, the very simple answer to the question with
which we started this essay: What do all those very diverse
folks down there in the Gorge have in common? Whatever
their precise interests and techniques, they are all engaged
in the attempt to expand, refine, and above all to test what
we think we know about the past: an exercise that will
ensure that this and other fields of scientific investigation
will continue to evolve as long as there are scientists.
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